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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET DOOLY OLWELL,
et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

RESPON~ENTS'

PETITI0N FOR

vs.
THOMAS A. CLARK, et al.,

BRIEF O~
REHEA~ING

Case No. 17595

Defendants-Appellants.

The respondents respectfully petition this Honorable
Court for:
I.

A rehearing, or that failing:

II. For an amendment of the remand portion of the
judgment, to include an order for determination of the amount
of contribution for which the appellants should contribute for
expense and taxes assessed to the property and paid by the respondents.
In discussing request No. I, respondents seek the
indulgence of the Court briefly to review the majority opinion,
in the hope they may suggest possible errors in interpretation
of the purpose of the adverse possession legislation and authorities cited as applied to the facts of this case. sufficient to
entertain a rehearing.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

For what it may be worth, it appears that the decision in asserting that the claim here is against a co-tenant,
technically is incorrect, since the claim actually is against
a tenant in common.

There are times when the difference be-

tween the two tenancies could, in a given case, lead to divergent results.
The opinion observes that, that except for one instance where a Trust Deed stated it was a transfer of "all"
the property, instead of the one-sixth really involved in this
case, the remaining documents of transfer dealt only with a onesixth interest.

We confess the error which is subject to re-

formation, but of no consequence in this case, except one.

The

error, however, in and of itself, is itself important, since
it represented a claim to all of the April claim, not just onesixth, and having been made in a document that was duly recorded, it was adverse to the one-sixth interest claimed by
appellants, and it constituted a "notice" to the world, including the appellants, of an adverse claim in their one-sixth
asserted interest.

This one circumstance, it is respectfully

suggested, renders the position taken in the majority opinion,
that there was no evidence of such notice or "bringing the claim
of adverse possession home to the Schulders," something short
of complete accuracy.

The very purpose of the Recording Acts

is to impart notice to the record owners of property, of error
or other facts appearing on the public record impeaching on~'s
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title.

Since the decision is based solely on lack of notice,

the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

This error

remained on the public record for years, during which time
appellants took no action to attack the claim.
In appellants' First Defense they asserted that
respondents' use was not open and notorious but if so, it was
with appellants' consent, and not in accord with the adverse
possession legislation, - an issue to be tried.

The case was

tried, and neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court found
any merit in the alleged defense.

Had there been no

findin~

on the question of notoriety and consent, under the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncement in Jones v. Hinkle, Utah, 611 P.2d
1
733 (1980)
appellants clearly are foreclosed from a favorable
judgment by failing to present specific evidence by affidavit,
or otherwise, though they had full opportunity to do so:
Pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, when a motion for summary
judgment is made, the affidavit of an adverse party must contain specific evidentiary facts showing that there is a genu~ne
issue for trial. Walker v. Rocky ~ountain
Recreation Corp., 29 Utah Zd 274, 508 P.2d
538 (1973); Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260,
436 P.2d 1021 (1968).
Defendants have failed
to identify with specificity any material
issue of fact, and plaintiff, as a matt7r of
law, is entitled to conveyance of the title.
The judgment of the trial court i~ i~ er~or;
indeed, the record shows that plaintiff is
entitled to summary judgment in her favor.
As to the Second Defense - that the taxes paid by
1. Also Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah Zd 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960)
and a number of other subsequent cases.
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respondents were made by them "voluntarily," such defense is
without merit, for several reasons:

Those mentioned in the

foregoing paragraph for failure of proof by affidavit or otherwise, and also because. in statutory adverse possession cases,
whether the taxes are paid voluntarily or not is of no moment.
The appellants' pleading consists of one short doc'1ment, - an "Answer," - and at most it is a denial without
supporting affidavits reciting specific facts creating a
triable issue, that if proved, would constitute an affirmative defense.
The facts supporting the trial court's judgment,
clearly show that for nearly 70 years, appellants offered no
reimbursement of taxes, did nothing to protect the property
as had the respondents, nor did they even list the property
along with other listed mining property in the inventory of
the estate of the Schulder grantee and alleged owner, filed
over 40 years ago, and still unlisted, all reflecting an
abandonment of their claim with the intention so to do.
Such silence, absence of attention to one's property, and actual neglect in failing to list it as an asset
in the estate, together with the universally accepted presumptions as to settling rights by passage of a long period
of time, that of establishing certainty of title by presuming a lost grant, abandonment, and others, are as weighty
in the scales of equity, as is the spoken word.
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All of the above can lead to no conclusion other
than some time over a 68 year period, the appellants or one
of them had "notice," or "knowledge" of, or "reasonably should
have known" of an adverse user, the most likely of which would
be a tenant in common, who, if one but looked at the tax
roll, would have found Ernest Bamberger or his successors who,
by the public record, clearly have been the payors of the
taxes during the entire span of 68 years.

The trial judge,

in entering the judgment now reversed, presumably weighed
the evidence, applied appropriate legislation, without any
abuse of discretion.

Under such circumstances, the Supreme

Court many times has said that which universally is axiomatic:
That the trial court's findings and judgment will not be reversed except for a clear showing of abuse of discretion.

No-

where in the majority opinion has any such abuse been referenced.
Citation for the principles stated is unnecessary.
However, the time-honored and often-quoted case of Stanley v.
Stanley, 94 P.2d 465 (Utah 1939) reflects the position of the
cases re-stated repeatedly over the years.
Apropos generally of the substantive law relating
to what is adequate "notice" necessary in tenancy-in-common
cases, is a case cited in the Court's own decision in McCready
v. Frederickson, which we espouse, found in 41 Utah 388, 126
P. 316 (1912),

which quotes from Elder v. McClaskey, 70 Fed.

2.
fhe appellants rely as heavily on the McCready case, which
they consider dispositive here.
It is the application of the
exhaustive principles restated to the application of the facts
of this case, which provoked this action, the lower court's
judgment, its appeal, the reversal and now the petition for
rehearing.
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542, a leading case, as follows:
It is not necessary for him (tenant)
to give actual notice of the ouster.
He
must, in the language of the authorities,
bring it home to his co-tenant.
But he may
do this ~ conduct the implication of which
cannot escape the notice of the world about
him, or of any one, though not a resident in
the neighborhood, who has an interest in the
property, and exercises that degree of attention in respect to what rsllis that tT!e law
presumes in every owner.
The decision in this case is not entirely accurate
in appraising the very basis upon which it was written, in
light of the purpose and wording of Rule 56.

The opinion

states that:
The Rule itself sets the criteria for
judgment: a party may receive the judgment requested if (a) the pleadings and affidavits,
if any show no issue as to any material fact,
and (b) the party [sic] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . Where the party
opposed to the motion submits no documents in
opposition, the moving party may be granted~
summary judgment only "if appropriate," that
is if he is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
The word "moving," which appears before "party"
in the Rule, apparently was omitted by mistake in the above
quotation.

However, its omission lends a different complex-

ion to the application of the Rule to this case.

The "mov-

ing" party mentioned in the Rule is Bamberger, who is the
beneficiary of the phrase "entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."

The Rule does not say that the non-movant, in this

case Schulder, is "entitled to judgment in his favor as a
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matter of law."

In other words, the Rule, under such circum-

stances does not entitle Schulder, no party to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, to a judgment quieting title to the property in him.
Such a result, however, appears to be the endproduct of the decision which remands the case "for entry of
judgment for the appellants."

The decision virtually quiets

title in Schulder based on facts actually presented by the
respondents, not the appellants.

The opinion says such facts

are insufficient to show title in Bambergers for only one
reason,

lack of notice, but sufficient to prove title in

someone else.

It is submitted that on appeal the decision at

least should have been against Bambergers but not for Schulders,
who filed no counterclaim, offered no proof whatever and even
did

no~

ask for any specific property nor did they even des-

cribe the property they might claim.

It is suggested that

if it still be the concensus of a majority that respondents
failed in proof, there should be a remand to modify, with
instructions to determine and adjudge the amount due from
appellants to respondents as contribution for the taxes and
expenses made by respondents, in line with the universally
accepted principle that equity requires such contribution.
The opinion, as evidenced by the quote above concedes that Rule 56 authorizes judgment in favor of the plaintiffs "if the pleadings and affidavits show no issue as to

-7-
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any material fact."

However, it minimizes the importance of

the word "pleadings," which is an equal conjunctive in Rule
56, and accepts nothing in the affidavits as reflective that
"notice" was given, or that appellants had "knowledge of,"
or "reasonably should have known of" the adverse claiJTl.

It

seems to have ignored the fact that Sec. 78-40-13, U.C.A.
requiring a trial in quiet title actions, with the taking of
evidence and entering Findings, expressly was employed and
its provisions satisfied in this case.
Based upon the facts "pleaded," an examination of
the documentary evidence of title introduced, taxes paid,
saving the property from forced tax sale, notoriety of ownership and the community, abandonment of claim by the tenantin-common, and reviewing the memoranda of authorities and
hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court took the
matter under advisement.

Based on the evidence adduced,

complemented by respondents' "Motion for Summary Judgment"
and on the Pleadings,

the Court entered Findings. Conclusions

and Judgment in favor of Bambergers, which, under well kn01·m
principles, presumptively were correct.
No objection was made to the Findings, or the Conclusions of the Judgment, based on any ground, including insufficiency of the evidence.

No Motion to Amend was filed

under Rule 52(b), based on that or any other ground, and no
Motion for a new Trial was made under Rule 59, based on that
or any other ground.

Under such circumstances a judgment

generally is affirmed on appeal. based on a presumptive corSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rectness, of the pleadings and record.

The decision in this

case being bottomed on "lack of notice," and the appeal not
stating specifically such issue on appeal, and the opinion
being specifically directed to such contentions, appears to
have raised it sua sponte, without the solicitation of the
losing party.
Parenthetically, a footnote in the opinion suggests
that "The determination that respondents' conduct constituted
adverse possession with adequate notice is not a finding of
fact but a conclusion of law."

Respondents respectfully

suggest this is a matter of debate, since "conduct" is an
important and necessary fact in order to prove adverse passession, as is the seven-year period, payment of the taxes,
etc.

The adverse possession statutes primarily are based on

proof of such facts, and in large part treat "presumptions"
as fact,

as does the majority opinion, which states:
Sec. 78-12-7 is Utah's adverse possession
statute, setting forth the preposition that
possession of real property is presumed to
be in the legal title holder and that occupancy by any other is deemed subordinate.
unless the occupant can show that the property
is held and possessed for seven years.
The above statement appears to have been made in

support of Schulder, as title holder.

The knife cuts both

ways, however, since Bamberger also is a title holder. to
which the presumption applies.

He, however, has the better

side of the presumption and merit, by proof of active occupancv.

- which Schulder has never claimed or asserted by
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pleaded fact,

counter-affidavit or otherwise.

Since the opinion bases its decision on actual
4

notice, citing the case it relies on primarily,

that says

notice must be given to a tenant-in-common by acts (conduct)
of the "most open and notorious" character, it is only fair
that the rest of the paragraph from which the phrase is lisLed
should be referred to, which reflects the real gist of the
requirement, especially as to property rights in unpopulated
areas and asserted over a long period of time, to the effect
that:
"It is not necessary for him to give
actual notice of this ouster of disseising
of his cotenant, to him.
He must, in the
language of the authorities, 'bring it home
to his cotenant.'
But he may do this by
conduct, the implication of which cannot
escape the notice of the world about him,
or of anyone, who has an interest in the
property, and exerCISeS-that degree-of
attention, in respect to what is his that
the law presumes in everyone."
We earnestly contend that upon the trial and under
Rule 56, the facts pleaded, presented at trial and shown by
affidavits, depositions and appellants' admissions, fully
justified the judgment entered by the trial court.

In aid of

such contention, it is pointed out that:
The pleading (complaint) asserted that a) the Respondents occupied, and claimed the property adversely for
more than a half century; b) paid the taxes for the required
statutory time; and that appellants did not assert, but
4. McCready v. Frederickson, supra, quoting Elder v.
McClaskey.

-10-
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abandoned any claim to the land (by filing no claim thereto
in the tenant-in-common's Estate.)
The maps (Ex. P-11) show that the Silver Queen claim
abuts the April claim, but that it was excluded by the Patent
(Ex. P-4); that it is owned by United Park City Mines, whose
Secretary-Treasurer, Mr. Osika, employed for 35 years, by the
United Park City Mines, gave his deposition (Ex. P-2), introduced in evidence, without objection, and by affidavit attached
to the pleadings, without objection, and testified that since
the Eighties, Ernest Bamberger "laid claim to these properties
(Several, including the April) over that period of time: and
that "most of these claims had a monument of sorts

which

pretty well disappeared," that he noticed there had been a
road that bisected the April, which is used occasionally, and
that the area is pretty much the same as it was 50 or 60 years
ago and that he has never heard of anyone else making claim to
the property; that his employer, United Park had stipulated, as
owners, of the Silver Queen, with respondents, as owners, of
the April, settling their boundaries and that he and the otr~r
officials of the Company considered and treated the Bambergers
as sole owners of the abutting April claim.
Mr. Dixon signed an affidavit which was introduced
in evidence without objection or counter-affidavit, who testified he had been an employee of Bambergers over twenty years
as Controller and would be the person who would receive claims
of interest in the subject property; that he had received

-11-
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none; that Ernest Bamberger claimed the property shown on
the tax notices as his own, sole property.
An affidavit was executed and filed without objection, by William H. Olwell, Secretary Treasurer of the respondent Bamberger charitable Foundation in which, under oath,
he stated that as such Secretary and also as co-executor of
Ernest Bamberger's widow's Estate, and representative of the
heirs, he knew the taxes were paid by respondents since 1958,
and that he has been approached by a number of prospective
purchasers in the area, as sole representation of the respondents, as sole owners of the property, without recognizing
any other claimant to the property.
A letter from Ernest Bamberger's accountant to the
Summit County Treasurer, was attached to the complaint, resisting a Tax Notice to the effect that the April had been
sold for taxes, followed by a hearing before the County Commission, who vacated the sale and thus preserved the property solely for Ernest Bamberger.
The tax notices (Ex. P) show payment of all taxes
since 1912, except for the year 1942, when it was necessary
for Bamberger's accountant to appear before the County Commissioners, who at an open meeting, whose minutes were recorded
and constituted notice of Mr. Bamberger's claim to the property entered an order crediting him with payment of the taxes
for 1942 and vacating the sale of the property theretofore
made.
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Under such circumstances, it is urged that the
Schulders' "had notice," or "knowledge of" or "reasonably
should have known" of the adverse claim, under the cases cited
in the majority opinion itself, which recognizes that actual
notice is not an absolute, nor an unconditional necessity to
acquire title by adverse possession against a tenant-incomrnon,

- which was the type of tenancy considered in such

cases.

The case most relied on by the opinion which concedes

that actual notice is unnecessary, is Mc Cready v. Frederickson, followed by Clotworthy v. Clyde, Herselt v. Herselt and
Bergstrom v. Bergstrom.
The evidence in the case, coupled with the presumptions having the stature of evidence, found in the various
adverse possession statutes, such as that mentioned in the
opinion, Sec. 78-12-7, and in 78-12-9, where adverse possession is deemed to have been possessed based on any one of four
"facts."

Also, in Sec. 78-12-10, where adverse holding is

deemed on possession exclusive of other rights, and other
presumptions recognized by the opinion as stated in Mccready,
together with the well known presumptions as to title by
passage of time as in titles by prescription, by lost grant,
and the like, appear fully to justify the trial court's judgment in this case.
II

The respondents, in requesting a remand with instruc-
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tions to determine the matter of entitlement by way of
contribution in tenancy-in-common cases, for payment of taxes
and expenses innuring to the benefit of and chargeable on a
pro-rata basis assessable against all the tenants it would
appear, that if no one of the concurring members of the Court
is disposed to review the Record again on appeal, as to the
facts and the law, it should follow as a matter of course,
that the case should be returned for such determination as to
the equities between the tenant parties, since this is a case
in equity.
In the case relied on mostly by the majority opinion, Mc Cready v. Frederickson, this right of contribution
should be litigated in this case.

There it was said that:

"We think the court has power to make
a decree quieting title .
. conditionally.
That is, the court may quiet title upon condition that he pay into court, within a time to
oe-Tixed by it, his proportion of the taxes and
accrued interest and such other sums as the
court may find he should pay under the law.
In case appellant shall pay the taxes and accrued interest thereon, together with any other
sums that the court may find legal and just,
the title to (appellants') interest in said
premises should be quieted in him."
This right of contribution is acknowledged also in
Herselt v. Herselt, cited in the majority opinion, and also
Sperry v. Tolley, where on one tenant's payment of taxes, the
Court said:
"He acquires no other or greater interest, except that he has a claim upon the others
for reimbursement according to their resoective
shares.
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Under such circumstances the remand "for entry of
judgment for the appellants" should be changed to provide
"for determining the amount of contribution, plus accrued
interest thereon and upon payment thereof, to enter judgment
quieting title to appellants' claim of interest," - as substantially was stated in McCready v. Frederickson.

Respectfully submitted this

day of December,

1982.

CLIFFORD L. ASHTON
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents.
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